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Abstract
France literally ‘discovered’ sexual abuse following neigh-
bour Belgium’s Dutroux case in the late 1990s. Since then,
sex offenders have been the focus of politicians, media and
law-makers’ attention. Further law reforms have aimed at
imposing mandatory supervision and treatment, and in rare
cases, preventive detention. The legal framework for man-
datory supervision and detention is rather complex, ranging
from a mixed sentence (custodial and mandatory supervi-
sion and treatment upon release or as a stand-alone sen-
tence) to so-called ‘safety measures’, which supposedly do
not aim at punishing an offence, but at protecting society.
The difference between the concepts of sentences and safe-
ty measures is nevertheless rather blurry. In practice, how-
ever, courts have used safety measures quite sparingly and
have preferred mandatory supervision as attached to a sen-
tence, notably because it is compatible with cardinal legal
principles. Procedural constraints have also contributed to
this limited use. Moreover, the type of supervision and
treatment that can thus be imposed is virtually identical to
that of ordinary probation. It is, however, noteworthy that a
higher number of offenders with mental health issues who
are deemed ‘dangerous’ are placed in special psychiatric
units, something that has not drawn much attention on the
part of human rights lawyers.
Keywords: Preventive detention, mandatory supervision, sex
offenders, retrospective penal laws, legality principle
1 Introduction
1.1 A Late Onset
It was essentially with the Dutroux case in neighbouring
Belgium that France suddenly discovered the issue of
sex offences against children, which it had previously
ignored – just as it only criminalised rape in 1980.1 The
press thus played an important role in drawing attention
* Martine H-Evans, PhD, is a Professor at the Department of Law, Uni-
versite de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. This article is part of a compara-
tive research project involving several European jurisdictions, of which
the results are presented in this special issue. For further background of
the theme and outline of the issue and individual articles, as well as the
comparative analysis, see the contribution by Van der Wolf in this issue.
1. Prior to 1980, rape was a felony.
to a type of offence that its patriarchal culture had pre-
ferred to ignore. France, however, does not have a wide-
ly read populist press, in contrast with, for instance,
England and Wales. Therefore, in addition to describing
events that have occurred or court hearings that deal
with high-profile sex offenders, it also tends to raise
deeper questions, such as why sex offenders tend to
commit new crimes and whether treatment works –
although it tends to ignore science in doing so. None-
theless, as in many other jurisdictions, when a sex
offender who has been released on parole (libération con-
ditionnelle) reoffends quite dramatically, the media raises
questions as to why he was released in the first place and
tends to cast blame on a system that allows such a thing
to happen and, in some cases, onto those who made the
decision or those who assessed him/her as being low
risk. For instance, in a recent case in which the offender,
a psychopath with twenty prior convictions and numer-
ous violations of previous community sentences and
measures, sexually abused and battered two young
women, one of whom nearly died, the press pointed to
the fact that he was on ‘semi-freedom’ (semi-liberté), a
measure whereby the offender has to spend nights in
prison, but can circulate in the community during the
day.2
1.2 Sex Offending and Politics
Inevitably, then, the press – and, even more so, the
widely watched 8 O’clock evening news – is an essential
piece of the equation when it comes to understanding
French sex offences law. For indeed, virtually every sin-
gle piece of legislation that has been enacted over the
past two decades has reacted to a ‘fait divers’ (high-pro-
file crime), and this has been true whether the extant
government was punitive (‘the right’) or more lenient
(‘the left’). In 1994, a ‘true life’ (perpétuité réelle) sen-
tence was created following the death of a child by a
paedophile; in 1998, the ‘socio-judicial supervision’ (sui-
vi socio-judiciaire – SSJ) Act enacted by the socialist
government directly followed the Dutroux case. By the
time Nicolas Sarkozy became the Minister of the Interi-
or (2002-2007) and then the President (2007-2012), the
media’s attention had fully switched to sex offenders,
and in particular, recidivists. During a ten-year legisla-
tive frenzy, Nicolas Sarkozy enacted no less than twelve
2. Le Parisien, 11 août 2015.
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criminal law Acts, several of which focused, inter alia,
on sex offenders (2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012 Acts3).
Each time, he reacted to yet another high-profile case.
For instance, the 2012 Act was passed following the
Meilhon case,4 in which a repeat offender who had sexu-
ally assaulted his co-inmate – information that was not
communicated by the prison-based probation service to
its community-based fellow agency – abducted a young
girl after his release, whom he raped and assassinated.
The media’s attention focused on the licence he was giv-
en following his release: no supervision whatsoever had
been put in place because of the local probation services’
extreme workload (200 cases per probation officer).
Every single point of Mr Sarkozy’s laws was fiercely
criticised by the left opposition, in particular, those
imposing various forms of mandatory supervision or
detention (mesures de sûreté: ‘safety measures’) on sex
offenders upon their release. Yet, the current socialist
government’s former Minister of Justice, Ms Taubira,
did not abrogate a single point of them, and quite the
contrary, added one more ‘safety measure’ to the legal
system, focusing on offenders who had been declared
partially irresponsible by reason of insanity, some of
whom, though not all, were sex offenders. Currently,
the media’s and politicians’ attention are no longer on
sex offenders, and high-profile cases do not draw as
much attention as they did, as the main focus is now on
terrorists – as it was in the mid-1990s during the series
of attacks on France
Sex offenders – along with recidivists, with whom they
were often confused – were thus seen as national public
enemies from 1998 to the major Paris Charlie Hebdo
attack of January 2015. The legal heritage of those years,
as well as its rationale, has been left untouched.
What is clear then is that France mostly deals with such
issues in a purely political and ‘communicative’ (to the
media and the public) fashion; evidence and science play
little part in such debates nor in the legislations that are
enacted.
1.3 A Focus on Treatment
The 1998 Act fairly balanced punitive and treatment/
rehabilitative goals.5 Although the Dutroux case did
precipitate action, mandatory supervision and treatment
for sex offenders had been ‘in the air’ since the afore-
mentioned 1994 reform, and they had been advocated
3. Loi no. 2005-1549, 12 December 2005; Loi no. 2007-1198, 10 August
2007; Loi no. 2008-174 25 February 2008; Loi no. 2010-242 10 March
2010; Loi no. 2012-409 27 March 2012.
4. Inspection des services pénitentiaires, Rapport relatif aux conditions de
prise en charge de M. Tony Meilhon par le SPIP de Loire-Atlantique,
10 février (2011). Inspection judiciaire, Inspection de fonctionnement
du service de l’application des peines du tribunal de grande instance de
Nantes, Février, No. 13/2011 (2011).
5. J. Castaignède, ‘Le suivi socio-judiciaire applicable aux délinquants sex-
uels ou la dialectique sanction-traitement’, Recueil Dalloz 23 (1999); P.
Salvage, ‘Les soins obligatoires en matière pénale’, JCP ed. G., I, 4062
(1997); J. Castaignède, ‘La prise en charge des abuseurs sexuels par le
droit pénal’, in R. Cario and J.-C. Heraut (eds.), Les abuseurs sexuels:
quel(s) traitement(s)? (1998) 19.
by various commissions6 and specialists.7 In a rare case
of bipartisan agreement, the 1998 Act was submitted to
Parliament by the right-wing Minister of Justice Michel
Toubon, and it was his socialist successor, Elisabeth
Badinter, who obtained its enactment in 1998, after new
elections had interrupted her colleague’s initial attempt.
A similar lack of dispute marked the creation of the new
safety measure by Ms Taubira in 2014. In both cases,
this was because both legislations mostly consisted in
imposing treatment, something over which there was
strong political consensus.
Conversely, the entire Sarkozy era was plagued with
argumentative debates and disputes, probably because
the conservative politician’s stance was perceived as
being excessively punitive8 – even though the treatment
component was still at the forefront,9 as many of the
influencing commissions of the time reveal.10 It did not
help because such reforms took place against the back-
drop of other very punitive penal reforms.11 Many crit-
ics have also complained about his frantic legislative
production, which vastly transformed ‘sentence imple-
mentation’ law (droit de l’exécution des peines) to the
point that this legal field has become one of the most
uselessly complex of all. Each law consisted in refined
bifurcations and possibilities aimed at restricting parole
and coercing sex offenders into treatment whilst they
were in prison and after their release (for a simplified
overview, see Table 1 on pages 72-73).
More recently, criticism has furthermore focused on the
lack of human and financial resources in both the justice
and health sectors, and on the lack of evidence-based
support for the assessment and treatment of sex offend-
6. T. Lemperière, Rapport de la commission d’étude sur l’évaluation et
l’expertise psychiatrique des condamnés (1997); C. Balier, C. Parayre &
C. Parpillon, ‘Traitements des auteurs de délits et crimes sexuels. Con-
clusions et recommandations du groupe de travail’, Forensic 13 (1996).
7. D. Sagury, ‘Des soins pour les délinquants sexuels’, Le Monde 15-16
December, at 15 (1996).
8. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Récidive: surveiller et punir plus plutôt que prévenir
et guérir’, AJ Pénal 305 (2005).
9. J.-L. Senon and C. Manera, ‘L’obligation de soins dans la loi renforçant
la lutte contre la récidive’, AJ Pénal 367 (2007).
10. And notably: J.-P. Garraud, Rapport sur le Mission Parlementaire con-
fiée par le Premier Ministre à Monsieur Jean-Paul Garraud, député de la
Gironde, sur la Dangerosité et la prise en charge des individus danger-
eux, Ministère de la Justice et Ministère de la santé et des solidarités
(2006); E. Blanc, Rapport d’information sur le suivi des auteurs d’infrac-
tions à caractère sexuel, en conclusion des travaux d’une mission
d’information relative à l’exécution des décisions de justice, presided by
M.J.-L. Warsmann, 29 February, National Assembly, No. 4421 (2012);
E. Milgrom, P. Bouchard & J.P. Olié, ‘La prévention médicale de la réci-
dive chez les délinquants sexuels’, 194 Bulletin de l’Académie nationale
de médecine 1033 (2010).
11. J. Danet, Justice pénale, le tournant, Paris, Le Monde Actuel, Folio
(2006); V. Gautron, ‘De la société de surveillance à la rétention de sûr-
eté. Etapes, faux semblants, impasses et fuites en avant’, AJ Pénal 54
(2009); M. Herzog-Evans, ‘French Post Custody Law (2000-2009):
From Equitable Trial to the Religion of Control’, 1 European Journal of
Probation 97 (2009).
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ers,12 which has rendered the reforming logorrhoea of
the past two decades largely useless.
With the exception of the 1998 Act, which had reformed
the health and criminal laws equally, the changes adop-
ted thereafter essentially delegated the definition of the
legal framework to criminal law. That said, nothing
could be done without the contribution of health serv-
ices, which were increasingly mandated by penal courts
to assess and care for sex offenders. It is also important
to understand that, parallel to the mandatory treatment
imposed under criminal law, France also detains offend-
ers under the umbrella of mental health law. Sex offend-
ers who are diagnosed with a serious mental health con-
dition or who are currently deteriorating can naturally
be transferred to psychiatric wards for treatment under
ordinary health law regulations. The most dangerous of
them can also be detained in special psychiatric struc-
tures (Unités pour Malades Difficiles – UMD – Serious
Patient Units) regulated essentially by the Health Code,
which was amended in 2011.13 Sex offenders can thus be
detained under this more discreet regime, very few
political or academic debates have addressed it.
1.4 Three Different Reforming Era
Focusing essentially on criminal law rules, one can dis-
tinguish three different eras.14 The 1998 reform consis-
ted in creating a new sentence, which, at the time, was
lawful in view of the general legal framework and princi-
ples. This sentence, SSJ, consists in mandatory treat-
ment and supervision and is either a stand-alone com-
munity sentence or a post-custodial supervision sen-
tence. In many ways, with the exception of the legal
framework for treatment (see 2.6), this is, in fact, not
dissimilar to a regular probation sentence or a custodial
sentence combined with a probation licence upon
release.
During Nicolas Sarkozy’s governance, on the other
hand, many criminal law principles were violated. The
principle of legality was thus attacked when a 2007 Act
imposed mandatory treatment for people who could
have been liable to SSJ, but had not been thus sen-
tenced. The principles of legality, safety and perhaps
proportionality were also weakened when two laws
(2005, 2008) created a total of four ‘safety’ measures
(judicial safety surveillance of dangerous offenders –
SJPD; GPS-electronic monitoring – PSEM; safety sur-
veillance – SS; safety detention – RS15) that are restric-
12. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Outils d’évaluation: sortir des fantasmes et de
l’aveuglément idéologique’, AJ Pénal février 75 (2012) and our consul-
tation to the Parliament, available at: <http:// herzog -evans. com/
observations -ecrites -concernant -le -projet -de -loi -de -programmation -
relative -a -lexecution -des -peines/> (last visited 27 May 2016)
13. E. Péchillon ‘Censure partielle de la loi du 5 juillet 2011 relative aux
soins sous contrainte: vers une réforme en profondeur de la psychiatrie
avant octobre 2013? Note sous Conseil constitutionnel, décision no.
2012-235 QPC du 20 avril 2012, Association de réflexion et de proposi-
tion d’actions sur la psychiatrie’, 26 JCP Adm. 2230 (2012).
14. For a detailed presentation, see M. Herzog-Evans, Droit de l’exécution
des peines (2016).
15. SJPD: Surveillance judiciaire des personnes dangereuses; PSEM: Place-
ment sous surveillance électronique mobile; SS: Surveillance de sûreté;
RS: Rétention de sûreté.
tive or custodial measures imposed without a new
offence having been committed: they allow for the long-
term post-custodial supervision of sex and other violent
offenders and considerably extend the cases where
release must be preceded by risk assessment – risk
assessment that, as we shall see, is outdated and unrelia-
ble. Parallel to this, Nicolas Sarkozy also made it much
more difficult for sex offenders, recidivists and people
serving long prison sentences to obtain an early release.
Ms Taubira’s 2014 law reform, for her part, broke with
tradition by creating her own safety measure, whilst dis-
pensing with the solid procedural safeguards that her
predecessor had put into place to compensate for the
substantial law violations inherent in such safety meas-
ures.
In practice, SSJ is used more frequently than any of the
other tools, as courts patently favour measures that are
compatible with essential criminal law principles. That
being said, most sex offenders are, in practice, submit-
ted to ordinary sentences and measures, such as proba-
tion orders and custodial sentences, both of which can
include a treatment obligation.
There are currently no proposals for the extension of
safety measures. However, the opposition is already
adopting its usual ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric in the
media, prior to the upcoming regional (December 2015)
and presidential elections (2017), and it is highly likely
that the current legal arsenal will be extended if the
opposition wins the election. In view of the recent terro-
rist attacks on France in 2015, it is likely that such
changes will not focus on sex offenders.
It is impossible to list all of the specific regulations and
constraints to which sex offenders are submitted.
Therefore, focus will be on SSJ and the five existing
safety measures hereafter.
2 Legal Frameworks for SSJ
and Safety Measures
2.1 Pre-Legislative Justification
The justifications presented for SSJ and safety measures
have always represented a balance between three differ-
ent and somewhat opposing objectives: neutralisation,
rehabilitation and treatment. Whether from the left or
the right, politicians have justified every single point of
these measures by referring to these goals. Indeed, the
right places a little more emphasis on safety, whilst the
left places more emphasis on rehabilitation. However,
they have had a similar focus on treatment. Their dis-
course, identically, has thus been that all sex offenders
and some violent offenders need treatment and supervi-
sion when they are released; those committing the more
serious of these offences need, in addition to treatment
and supervision, some form of containment, be it via
GPS-EM or custody. Amongst specialists and academ-
ics, there has not been much opposition to the rehabili-
tative and treatment dimensions of these sentences and
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measures. The public debate has essentially focused on
safety detention. The media and politicians (left opposi-
tion) have mostly criticised the assault on the general
law principles embodied by safety detention, but have
mostly ignored the mandatory forms of supervision,
which unfortunately has allowed the latter, particularly
SJPD, to prosper, in spite of the commission of similar
violations and of the considerable increase in their
scope.
2.2 Target Group
Initially, the exclusive target group for SSJ was sex
offenders. Gradually, rather serious violent offences
were added, including some forms of domestic violence
and arson. Although, in practice, the list of offences has
increased, and its original scope has become a bit more
blurry, this sentence still essentially targets serious vio-
lent and sexual offences.16 The target groups for judicial
surveillance and PSEM are identical because the person
must be liable to SSJ for these measures to apply.
Safety detention and supervision are, so far, limited to a
very restricted list of extremely serious offences (Art.
706-53-13 of the Penal Criminal Code (PPC)), namely:
murder or premeditated murder, torture and barbarous
acts, rape; abduction and sequestration when committed
against a minor; and aggravated forms of murder or pre-
meditated murder, torture and barbarous acts, rape,
abduction and sequestration when committed against an
adult.
2.3 Definition of Risk and Danger
Leaving aside SSJ, for which no danger criterion is
imposed other than having committed a sex or violent
offence for which the law states that SSJ can be pro-
nounced, amongst safety measures, there is always a ref-
erence to either ‘dangerousness’ or the ‘risk of recidi-
vism’, or both. Here, legislators have obviously not
attempted to be clear and precise – thus adding to the
violation of the principle of legality – and the level of
confusion is such that it has become something of a joke
amongst lawyers.
As Table 1 shows, with SJPD, a ‘proven’ risk of ‘recidi-
vism’ is required (Art. 723-29 of the PPC). A patent
dual legal difficulty arises here. First, the concept of
‘recidivism’ – as opposed to reoffending – has a very
narrow legal definition under French law. This means
that if the offender is ‘lucky’ enough to escape the intri-
cacies of the concept of recidivism,17 but does reoffend,
he cannot be subjected to SJPD. Secondly, because
most experts are either unaware or reject evidence-based
16. On this extension: Herzog-Evans (2016), above n. 14, spe. chap. 428.
17. Recidivism is defined as being a second offence committed after a pre-
vious one has been punished by a criminal court of law and all appeals
and have been either exhausted or not used. Recidivism further requires
that the second offence is committed within a specific time frame,
which varies depending on the nature of the offence (misdemeanour,
felony, crime). With regard to certain classes of felonies, the second
offence additionally must be of an identical or a similar nature as
defined by the Penal Code (Penal Code, art. 132-8 to 132-16-5 – Her-
zog-Evans, Récidive, Encyclopédie Pénal et Procédure Pénale, Dalloz).
risk assessment tools,18 it cannot be said that the level of
risk can be ‘proven’ according to the current scientific
state of the art. As a matter of fact, in most cases,
experts tend to confusingly conclude that ‘one cannot
exclude that Mr X shall reoffend’. Adding to the legal
uncertainty, Article 723-31 of the PPC then requires
that the risk of recidivism must be established by expert
testimony, stating that the person in question is ‘danger-
ous’. In other words, the risk of recidivism has to be
proven via the person’s dangerousness! It is also the per-
son’s dangerousness, which is the governing criterion
for PSEM (Art. 131-36-10 of the Penal Code (PC)).
However, in this case, it does not have to be ‘proven’,
but merely mentioned by experts in their written testi-
mony.
With regard to SS and RS, the confusion stems from
the use of the concept of ‘particular dangerousness’
(Art. 706-53-13 of the PPC), which, one can attempt to
guess, refers to serious risk, although, in French, ‘par-
ticular’ can also translate into specific. According to the
PPC, this dangerousness further has to be characterised
by ‘a high probability of recidivism because they [the
persons in question] suffer from a serious personality
disorder’. In other words, it is dangerousness which is
proven by a risk of recidivism (sic), rather than the other
way around. Furthermore, a ‘serious’ personality disor-
der is an additional condition, which raises the following
question: what distinguishes a serious personality disor-
der from a less serious one, and how can this adjective
provide the clarity and consistency required of criminal
law decisions under the cardinal principle of legality? It
does not help because French psychologists and psy-
chiatrists do not always follow international guidelines,
and use their own unheard of personality disorder cate-
gorisations, the most widely used being ‘perversion’,19 a
concept that finds its root in psychoanalysis.20
18. A. Baratta, A. Morali & O. Halleguen, ‘La dangerosité des malades
mentaux bénéficiant de l’article 122-1. A propos d’une étude rétrospec-
tive portant sur 58 cas’, 88 L’information psychiatrique 559 (2012). In
English: M. Herzog-Evans, ‘“What on Earth Can This Possibly Mean?”
French Reentry Courts and Experts Risk Assessment’, 44 International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 98, online first: doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.
2015.08.036 (2015).
19. G. Pirlot and H.L. Pedinielli, Les perversions sexuelles et narcissiques,
3rd edn (2013).
20. S. Freud, Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality) (1905).
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In itself, the dangerousness criterion has been nearly
unanimously criticised in French legal doctrine,21
including by traditionally conservative lawyers.22
Indeed, it has been argued that this concept cannot be
defined in a precise and predictable fashion, as required
by the principle of legality. Although some authors have
attempted to theorise this construct and have, for
instance, distinguished between ‘criminological danger-
ousness’ and ‘psychiatric dangerousness’,23 a dichotomy
widely used by psychiatrists in their testimonies, such a
dichotomy has been rejected by the minority of practi-
tioners who have adopted a more evidence-based
approach.24
One of the major issues with evaluations has also been
the very possibility that risk can be assessed, with some
left-leaning commentators seriously doubting it and
referring to a ‘Minority Report’ syndrome’.25 Currently,
the vast majority of experts26 and the majority of judg-
es27 are opposed to actuarial or other structured risk
assessment tools. There also is a patent lack of a ‘danger
culture’ amongst psychiatrists.28 This resistance is both
political and theoretical: by far the dominant treatment
model in France is psychoanalysis and the general popu-
lation has adopted this treatment framework as if it were
an absolute truth.29
Things may improve in the future, as some practitioners
are obtaining training in evidence-based assessment,
21. See inter alia: P.-J. Delage, ‘La dangerosité comme éclipse de l’imputa-
bilité et de la dignité’, RSC 797 (2007); P. Mbanzoulou, ‘La dangerosité
des détenus. Un concept flou aux conséquences bien visibles: le PSEM
et la rétention de sûreté’, AJ Pénal 171 (2008); P. Mbanzoulou, H.
Baze, O. Razac & J. Alvarez, Les nouvelles figures de la dangerosité
(2008); G. Giudicelli-Delage, ‘Droit pénal de la dangerosité – Droit
pénal de l’ennemi’, RSC 69 (2010); A. Coche, ‘Faut-il supprimer les
expertise de dangerosité?’, RSC 21 (2011); J.-L. Senon and C. Manza-
nera, ‘Psychiatrie et justice: de nécessaires clarifications à l’occasion de
la loi relative à la rétention de sûreté’, AJ Pénal 176 (2008); C. Protais
and D. Moreau, ‘L’expertise psychiatrique entre l’évaluation de la
responsabilité et de la dangerosité, entre le médical et le judiciaire.
Commentaire du texte de Samuel Léé’, Séminaire GERN ‘Longues
peines et peines indéfinies. Punir la dangerosité’, Paris, 21 March
(2008); M. Benezec, T.H. Pham & P. Le Bihan, ‘Les nouvelles disposi-
tions concernant les criminels malades mentaux dans la loi du 25 février
2008 relative à la rétention de sûreté et à la déclaration d’irresponsabi-
lité pénale pour cause de trouble mental: Une nécessaire évaluation du
risque criminel’, 167 Annales Médico-Psychologiques 39 (2009).
22. P. Conte, S. Tzitzis & G. Bernard, Peine, dangerosité. Quelles certi-
tudes? (2010).
23. P. Mbanzoulou, ‘La dangerosité’, in M. Herzog-Evans (ed.), Transna-
tional Criminology Manual, Volume I (2010) at 109.
24. A. Baratta, A. Morali & O. Halleguen, ‘La dangerosité des malades
mentaux bénéficiant de L’article 122-1. A propos d’une étude rétro-
spective portant sur 58 cas’, 88 L’information psychiatrique 559
(2012).
25. In this vein: F. Fiechter-Boulvard, ‘La dangerosité: encore et toujours…’,
AJ Pénal 67 (2012).
26. Ibid.
27. Herzog-Evans (2015), above n. 18.
28. O. Halleguen, ‘Prise en charge des patients psychiatriques dangereux’,
presentation at the conference of the Institut pour la Justice, December
14 – PDF of the presentation available at: <www. institutpourlajustice.
org/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2012/ 10/ EA -N%C2%B014_ mail1. pdf> (last
visited 7 November 2015) (2013).
29. M. Borch-Jacobsen, J. Cottraux, D. Pleux, J. Van Rillaert & C. Meyer, Le
livre noir de la psychanalyse. Vivre, penser et aller mieux sans Freud
(2005).
particularly those operating in Centres Nationaux
d’Evaluation (CNE – National Assessment Centres),
which are in charge of an additional level of assessment
required by some safety measures.
The recent safety measure created by Ms Taubira relies
on a more reliable criterion: it applies to offenders who
have been declared partially irresponsible by reason of
insanity, according to Article 122-1 of the PC (Art.
706-136-1 of the PPC).
2.3.1 General Presentation of the Legal Framework
The rules governing SSJ and safety measures are so
complex that this article will present a table rather than
engaging in endless descriptions (see next page).
Under the current French Constitution (1958), it is the
executive power, i.e. the government, who submits laws
to the legislature, which has little room to manoeuvre
when it comes to discussing Bills. Moreover, only Bills
submitted by the executive have a chance to be regis-
tered in the Parliament’s diary. The 1958 Constitution
also allows the executive to benefit from its own very
large legislative domains.30 Lastly, administrations, and
particularly the prison services, regularly issue internal
circulars that infringe on the domains of both decrees
and laws, and this is alas particularly true in the case of
criminal law.31 In view of these Constitutional princi-
ples, SSJ and safety measures were created by laws, but
the details of their regime have been subjected to several
decrees.32 To summarise, the executive enjoys consider-
able legislative powers.
2.4 Procedural Provisions
SJJ abides by ordinary criminal procedure regulations
pertaining to sentencing, which comprise public hear-
ings, the rights to counsel and to appear in court for an
adversarial hearing, and access to the file and other due
process principles.33 For safety measures, a host of pro-
cedural safeguards have been put in place, which has
contributed to their limited use. However, from a
human rights viewpoint, they do not sufficiently com-
pensate for the aforementioned loose criteria. As shown
in Table 2 on page 75, except for the right to appear in
court, to have access to the file, and to counsel and
appeal, most of the rules vary from one measure to
another. Reformers have considered that the higher the
court making the decision, the more protected offenders
would be. A more stringent condition appears to be the
three layers of risk assessment imposed by most safety
measures: a) by an expert; b) after a placement of up to
six weeks in the aforementioned CNE, by these centres’
multidisciplinary teams of practitioners; and c) by a so-
called multidisciplinary commission for safety measures
(Commission multidisciplinaire des mesures de sûreté –
30. F. Mitterrand, Le coup d’état permanent (1964); D. Rousseau, ‘L’objet
de la Constitution ce n’est pas l’Etat mais la société’, Critique 428
(2012).
31. For illustrations, see Herzog-Evans (2016), above n. 14, spe. chap. 01,
and in the case of safety detention, see M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Les textes
d’application de la loi Rétention de sûreté, Recueil Dalloz 3098 (2008).
32. Ibid.
33. S. Guinchard and B. Buisson, Procédure pénale, 10th edn (2014).
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CPMS). The reason why these layers limit the number
of safety measures that are being imposed is that they
take a minimum of six to twelve months to complete,
which is a precious time that many courts do not have
and a very costly and demanding system in terms of
material and human resources. Moreover, judges are not
impervious to the fact that CPMS is not composed of
risk assessment experts, but of lawyers, gendarmes and
laypersons, along with one psychologist or psychiatrist.
In practice, they simply follow the conclusions con-
tained in the expert testimony or in the CNE reports.34
However, because, in most cases, none of the aforemen-
tioned will have used evidence-based tools, an excep-
tionally high level of false negatives or false positives is
to be expected,35 which is not compensated by a right to
a counter-assessment. Indeed, if the offender asks for a
counter-assessment, he depends on the good will of the
judge, who has the discretion to determine whether to
appoint another state-funded expert or whether the
offender must pay privately for an independent expert,
which would not be covered by legal aid.36
Public hearings are not the rule in the implementation
of French sentences, as legislators have always consid-
ered that people’s privacy was more important at this
stage of the criminal process.37 However, with the more
stringent safety measures (SS and RS), the offender
who requires a public hearing is obligatorily granted
one. In practice, very few offenders actually request a
public hearing, many preferring it to be held in
camera.38 More debatably, with RS, most hearings are
held via videoconferencing,39 which creates difficulties
for the defence.40
Astonishingly, the Taubira Act (2014) has not imple-
mented a single procedural safeguard beyond the basic
due process rules, and even those due process rules are
the result of doctrinal interpretation, as the law is com-
pletely silent on this point.41 The competence lies with a
single judge court, the sentence implementing judge
(juge de l’application des peines – JAP), that is a judge in
charge of release, sanctions and supervising offenders
serving a community sentence or measure. Moreover,
rather than requiring expert testimony, the law original-
ly only requested a ‘medical opinion’. Fortunately, a
decree has ‘corrected’ the law – a classic violation of a
superior norm, but in this case a welcomed one – and
stipulated that it should, in fact, be an independent
expert.
Importantly, none of the procedures – with the excep-
tion of SSJ and RS, when they are pronounced ab initio
34. A. Morice and N. D’Hervé, Justice de sûreté et gestion des risques.
Approche pratique et réflexive (2010).
35. And found: A. Baratta, A. Morali & O. Halleguen, ‘La vérité sur l’exper-
tise post-sentencielle: évaluation clinique contre échelle actuarielle’, 170
Annales Médico-Psychologiques 96 (2012).
36. Herzog-Evans (2016), above n. 14, spe. chap. 811.
37. Ibid., chap. 01.
38. G. Lorho, ‘L’audience devant la JRRS’, AJ Pénal 109 (2014).
39. Ibid.
40. V. Bianchi, ‘Quels droits de la défense pour la personne placée sous sur-
veillance de sûreté ou en rétention de sûreté?’, AJ Pénal 106 (2014).
41. Herzog-Evans (2016), above n. 14, spe. chap. 537.
by a criminal sentencing court – allow the victim to be
present in court or to be represented.
2.5 Maximum Length of Mandatory Supervision
As seen in Table 1, SSJ can be perpetual when it follows
the release of a lifer, and is otherwise potentially very
lengthy, although, as we shall see later, courts have been
quite reasonable in that respect. SJPD typically lasts for
two to three years, depending on the extent to which
offenders have benefited from remission for good con-
duct (Art. 721 PPC) or for re-socialisation efforts (Art.
721-1 PPC). Before the 2014 Act, remission granted to
recidivists was half of the length, which was granted to
first-time offenders, with the paradoxical consequence
that they could be supervised under SJPD for shorter
durations. The 2014 Act has abrogated this discrimina-
tion. It is precisely because the length of SJPD could
not exceed that remission, thereby ensuring that the
total length of social control exercised upon the offender
would not exceed the total length of the pronounced
custodial sentence, that the Constitutional Council (CC)
had initially declared SJPD compatible with the consti-
tution. However, legislators wanted to control sex
offenders for extended periods of time and to allow for
the prolongation of shorter measures. This is why the
2008 Act allowed SS to be used in order to prolong SSJ
and SJPD (and incidentally, parole). The first decision
was to be made for one year (two as of the 2010 Act) and
could be renewable ad infinitum. In other words, via SS,
legislators have allowed the courts to perpetually pro-
long a sentence (SSJ), a release measure (parole) and a
temporary safety measure (SJPD), in direct violation of
the principle of legality.
2.6 Conditions Attached to Safety Measures
In spite of such shocking violations of the general prin-
ciples of criminal law, what can actually be imposed in
most cases is an ordinary form of probation, which
means the offender is placed under the supervision of a
JAP and a probation service. This ordinary probation is
thus usually regulated by exactly the same rules as those
governing community sentences and measures (i.e. Arts.
132-44 and 132-45 PC), with most judges choosing just
a few amongst the twenty-two possible obligations listed
in Article 132-45. These generally are paying damages,
fixing one’s abode at a particular address, getting treat-
ment and seeking employment. The main difference in
cases involving sex offenders is that the courts tend to
add contact-restraining obligations.42 When a specific
treatment ‘injunction’ (as opposed to a regular treatment
‘obligation’) is imposed, as provided for in the rules
governing SSJ (which can be imposed for SJPD, with or
without PSEM, and for SS), two medical practitioners
are in charge of supervision instead of one: a coordinat-
ing doctor and a treatment doctor. Rather than adding
to the pressure on the offender, one of them, the ‘coor-
dinating doctor’ acts as a shield between the JAP and
42. For the Courts’ typical practices, see M. Herzog-Evans, French Reentry
Courts: Mister Jourdain of Desistance (2014).
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the offender, in order to better protect his privacy
against potential violations of the principle of professio-
nal secrecy. Offenders are thus better protected than
they would be with regular probation with an ordinary
treatment obligation. Recently, however, violations of
the secrecy principle were imposed in the latest Sarkozy
reforms (2010-2012), which, in particular, allow a health
practitioner to bypass the coordinating doctor and to
communicate to the JAP that some changes are occur-
ring that are increasing the level of risk.
Other than that, offenders’ liberties are not impacted
much more than those of regular probationers. Notably,
bans or even controls on their use of computers or the
Internet cannot be imposed.43 It is only when it is estab-
lished that they have committed a non-contact sex
offence (such as downloading paedo-pornographic
images or videos) that they can be sentenced. Without
adequate control, this is bound to be rare. In the same
vein, under the current legislation, there is simply no
way to regularly control their alcohol or drug intake,
and no alcohol consumption ban can be imposed;
offenders can only be banned from going to bars –
which leaves them free to buy as much alcohol as they
want from supermarkets.44
It is only when PSEM is added to a sentence or measure
that it becomes very stringent because PSEM technolo-
gy is not discreet and is extremely dysfunctional, as we
shall see next. Safety detention is perhaps the most
shocking of all of the measures because it deprives ex-
offenders of their liberty when they have not committed
a new offence. It is therefore reassuring that this meas-
ure has hardly ever been used.
2.7 Practical Use of Safety Measures
The overall use of SSJ increased during the first year,
but has stabilised since 2010. However, SSJ is still far
from being systematically imposed on sex offenders. For
instance, in 2010, only 39.1% of the total sentences for
rape comprised SSJ, whilst the use of SSJ with other
sex offences ranged from 4.4% to 9.4%. Judges tend to
impose SSJ much more frequently when there are sev-
eral sex offences. They pronounce it in 87.5% of multi-
ple rape cases; likewise, when the person is a reoffender,
he has 4.7 times more chance of being thus sentenced.
Conversely, a minor incurs 4.2 times less risk of being
sentenced to SSJ.45 Overall, the length of SSJ has been
quite reasonable, and far from the legal maximum, even
from the very beginning of its implementation.46 Offi-
cial statistics published in 201347 reveal that the average
43. A recent case examined by the Civil Tribunal of Reims (Reims, TGI, Ord.
Référé, 28 September 2011, No. 11/00180) thus had to reject the vic-
tim’s application for the offender to be banned from using Facebook,
available at: <www. numerama. com/ magazine/ 19996 -un -ex -delinquant
-sexuel -echappe -a -l -exclusion -des -reseaux -sociaux. html> (last visited 8
November 2015).
44. Herzog-Evans, (2016), above n. 14, spe. chap. 613.
45. R. Josnin, ‘Le recours au suivi socio-judiciaire’, 121 Infostat Justice Feb-
ruary (2013).
46. V. Carrasco, ‘Le suivi socio-judiciaire: bilan de l’application de la loi du
17 juin 1998’, 94 Infostat Justice May (2007).
47. R. Josnin, ‘Le recours au suivi socio-judiciaire’, 121 Infostat Justice Feb-
ruary (2013).
length is six years for crimes and five years for felonies,
and paedophiles tend to be sentenced to longer SSJ than
other sex offenders. Recidivists also serve longer SSJ
sentences: eight years on average, as opposed to six for a
criminal.
It is very difficult to obtain data pertaining to the use of
safety measures. There simply are no regular public sta-
tistics published on this subject. Most of what we know
was published in a Parliamentary report, ‘the Blanc
Report’,48 in 2012. We thus learn that 80% of PSEM
are pronounced in sex offence cases and that, in most of
these cases, the measure is pronounced alongside a
SJPD safety measure. The figures are rather low: in
2011, only 53 people were subjected to PSEM, and a
total of 132 people were subjected to PSEM from 2007
to 2011. The percentage of recall over this period was
25%. If this measure has not been used frequently, it is
because of the judiciary’s mistrust in safety measures in
general. In the case of PSEM, it is also because the tech-
nology is far from being operational. Many cases of
alarms ringing whilst the person was in court or at the
probation service for a regular meeting have been repor-
ted,49 along with multiple occurrences where the person
was awakened several times during the night by a dys-
functional alarm or perhaps by deliberately malicious
behaviour on the part of the monitoring team.
There are unfortunately no official data on SJPD, with
the result that, incredibly, there is no way of knowing
how frequently it is being used.50 The same is astonish-
ingly true with SS. However, in this case, in 2012, a
Parliamentary question was put to the Ministry of Jus-
tice,51 which answered that, by 20 December 2012,
twenty-two people had been submitted to SS since the
enactment of the 2008 Act. The Ministry of Justice also
revealed that nineteen were still under supervision. The
Ministry added that, in most cases, SS had been pro-
nounced in order to prolong SJPD and that most of
them pertained to sex offences.52
We know of the imposition of RS via the media, which
tells us just how rarely it happens. In practice, five peo-
ple have so far been placed under safety detention for
very short periods of time, as revealed by the Depriva-
tion of Liberty General Controller (Contrôleur général
des lieux de privation de liberté – hereafter the Controller)
in 2015.53
None of the practices described here have been evalu-
ated academically. However, some reports have
48. E. Blanc, Rapport d’information sur le suivi des auteurs d’infractions à
caractère sexuel, en conclusion des travaux d’une mission d’informa-
tion relative à l’exécution des décisions de justice, Commission presi-
ded over by M. J.-L. Warsmann, 29 February, National Assembly, No.
4421 (2012).
49. Ibid.
50. We also asked the people in charge of the intranet data available to
judges, which are not communicated to the public, whether data exis-
ted, but were not published. We were told that no such data were col-
lected at all.
51. Written Question No. 00845 by M. Jacques Mézard, Senator, JO Sénat
19 July (2012).
52. Ministry of Justice Answer, JO Sénat 20 December, 3007 (2012).
53. CGLPL, Avis du 5 octobre 2015 relatif à la rétention de sûreté, JO
5 November, 59 (2015).
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addressed their implementation. The aforementioned
Blanc report (2012) recommended that more evidence-
based assessment and treatment should be delivered in
the case of safety measures and SSJ.
2.8 Jurisprudence’s Control over Safety
Measures
Immediately after a law is passed, and before it is pro-
mulgated by the president of the Republic, members of
both chambers of the Parliament (National Assembly
and Senate) can refer it to the CC for an appraisal of its
constitutionality. This first-line control of the legislation
presented in this article was seized by the MPs in
2005,54 200855 and 2014.56 In each case, the CC consid-
ered that the new measures were compatible with the
Constitution, and particularly, with the constitutional
principles of necessity, in spite of the perpetual nature
of several of them. However, in the case of RS, the CC
attempted to limit its retrospective nature, whilst turn-
ing a blind eye to this very retrospective nature in the
case of SS. The CC stated that it could not be retro-
spective when RS is pronounced by a criminal court.
This led to a special commission57 consulted by the then
Minister of Justice Ms Dati, which stated that when RS
was pronounced as a sanction for the violation of SS, it
could conversely be retrospective. To ensure this would
be the case, Nicolas Sarkozy had it set in legislative
stone with a new 2010 Act without, it must be noted,
meeting any significant opposition.
Overall, first (sentencing courts, JAP, TAP, JRRS) and
second (courts of appeal) level courts have been
extremely cautious in the use of SSJ and safety meas-
ures. Most courts have preferred to opt for regular
forms of supervision, first because it ensures that legal
principles are not violated. Indeed, French courts are
very attached to the principles that regulate criminal law
and in particular the principle of legality, the conse-
quence being that any piece of legislation that infringes
this principle is typically ignored or marginalised. A sec-
ond reason why courts have preferred regular forms of
supervision can be found in JAP and TAP’s professional
culture: their main guideline is rehabilitation and desist-
ance. A third obstacle to the wide implementation of
safety measures has been practical in nature: courts are
well aware that there simply are not enough psychia-
trists (particularly in the case of a treatment injunction,
where two psychiatrists are required) and probation
officers to adequately supervise offenders, even those
who have committed serious crimes.
Most courts have fourthly been very constrained by the
dangerousness or reoffending risk criteria, particularly
in the case of SJPD, for which they have to be ‘proven’.
Thus, one court, for instance, rejected the prosecutor’s
requisitions for SJPD pertaining to an offender who had
54. CC, 8 décembre 2005, no. 2005-527 DC.
55. CC, 21 février 2008, no. 2008-562 DC.
56. CC, 7 août 2014, no. 2014-696 DC.
57. V. Lamanda, Amoindrir les risques de récidive criminelle des con-
damnés dangereux, Rapport au président de la République, 30 May
(2008).
committed a sex offence against a minor under the age
of 15, because, in his case, experts had indicated that ‘he
may benefit from treatment’, which meant that his risk
of reoffending had not been ‘proven’.58 In the same case,
though, the court of appeal then pronounced SJPD
– retrospectively, with regard to the date of the
offence – which was confirmed by the Court of Cassa-
tion.59
Courts have also exercised control over the execution of
the two most stringent safety measures. In the case of
PSEM, administrative courts have considered that the
prison services should do a better job of protecting
offenders from ‘serious infringements on their private
lives’ (notably being awakened several times during the
night) as a direct result of the poor technology used in
the case of PSEM, although, in one particular instance,
the offender’s application failed, as he had not used an
adequate procedure.60 In the case of RS, the Court of
Cassation (JNRS chamber) overturned a placement in
RS where the court and experts had assessed the person
as being dangerous solely based on the fact that he
refused to submit to treatment.61 For its part, the Con-
troller recently criticised this measure’s regime in no
uncertain terms, stating in particular that it violated all
of the general principles of criminal law and procedure
(specifically, the principles of legality and the prohibi-
tion of retrospective criminal laws that are harsher), that
detention was too similar to regular prison detention,
and therefore violated the principle of proportionality,
and that the treatment offered was of insufficient quali-
ty. However, she complimented the prison services for
the good conditions of detainees’ quarters and cells. She
nonetheless called for the outright abolition of safety
detention.62 The highest administrative Court, the
Council of State, has abrogated the Fresnes RS centre’s
internal regulations pertaining to visitations and corre-
spondence, precisely because they were too similar to
prison regulations and were therefore too restrictive.63
Conversely, and quite contradictorily, the Council of
State refused to abrogate another decree that had initial-
ly allowed the institution of such restrictions.64
Moreover, most jurisdictions have had no trouble in
implementing SJPD, PSEM and SS retrospectively,
with only a few exceptions.65 With PSEM, in big cities,
where schools, kindergartens and sports settings for
children abound, some offenders must be limited to a
very strict perimeter, which, contrary to the general
legal principle governing criminal law, has not led to
58. TAP Agen, 8 June 2009, no. 200700102931, AJ Pénal 421, obs.
M. Herzog-Evans (2009).
59. Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 1 April 2009, AJ Pénal 321, obs.
M. Herzog-Evans (2009).
60. CE 26 October 2011, Beaumont, Applic. No. 350081, AJDA. 434, note
G. Eveillard (2012).
61. JRRS, 17 December 2014.
62. CGLPL, Avis du 5 octobre 2015 relatif à la rétention de sûreté, JO
5 November 59 (2015).
63. CE 31 October 2011, Applic. No. 332707.
64. CE 26 November 2010, Applic. No. 323694.
65. Court of Appeal, CHAP, Versailles, 1 April 2008, AJ Pénal 323, obs.
M. Herzog-Evans (2008).
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significant judicial control.66 This is in direct viola-
tion of Article IV-19 of the Recommendation
CMRec(2014)4 on electronic monitoring, which states:
‘In cases where electronic monitoring relates to exclu-
sion from, or limitation to, specific zones, efforts shall
be made to ensure that such conditions of execution are
not so restrictive as to prevent a reasonable quality of
everyday life in the community’.
2.9 Authorities in Charge of Supervision and
Breach
It is the JAP, a general release and re-entry court, assis-
ted by state probation officers – and in many cases, with
the added support of the third sector – which are in
charge of supervising offenders serving a SSJ or a safety
measure. Again, in this respect, there is no difference
from a regular form of probation. In some cases, the
JAP may ask the police to conduct an investigation, but
in practice the police do not like being associated with
the supervision of people serving community measures,
preferring to focus on those who have not yet been sen-
tenced.
Importantly, these practitioners and agencies work sepa-
rately, and sequentially, rather than in an integrated
way. There is no French equivalent to England and
Wales’ MAPPA,67 and quite conversely, the overall atti-
tude and culture are rather territorial and corporatist,68
with the consequence that collaboration is rather rare.69
As a result, the flow of information between practition-
ers is not sufficient, which sometimes contributes to
crimes being committed.70
The rules governing sanctions for the violation of SSJ
and safety measures are complex and intricate, and
Table 3 attempts to clarify these rules (see next page).
Sanctions can also apply when the person refuses SJPD,
PSEM or treatment. In most of these cases, the rules are
laid down either in the PC or the PPC, and fair trial and
procedural principles apply. However, with the excep-
tion of SS and RS, for which the JRRS is still compe-
tent, when the sanction is custodial, it is systematically
imposed by the JAP, not a collegial court. It is also note-
66. Such as in this case, where the court de facto limited the offender to
one street block: Court of Appeal (CHAP) Bordeaux, 29 Mai 2009, AJ
Pénal 509, obs. M. Herzog-Evans (2009).
67. J. Wood and H. Kemshall, The Operation and Experience of Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), Home Office Online
Report 12/07 (2007).
68. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Explaining French Probation: Social Work in a prison
Administration’, in I. Durnescu and F. McNeill (eds.), Understanding
Penal Practice (2013) 63; and ‘France: Legal Architecture, Political Pos-
turing, ‘Prisonbation’ and Adieu Social Work‘, in G. Robinson and F.
McNeill (eds.), Community Punishment. European Perspective (2015)
51.
69. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘“All Hands on Deck”: (re)mettre le travail en parte-
nariat au centre de la probation’, AJ Pénal March: 139 (2013).
70. As in the Chloé case (2013), where a probation officer simply sent a fax
to the JAP informing him/her that a sex offender had disappeared, rath-
er than contacting him/her in person (the fax machine happened to be
out of order), allowing the offender to abduct and rape a young girl for
an entire week, before they were miraculously found by the police in
Germany thanks to a road accident. See Television Network France
Info, available at: <www. francetvinfo. fr/ faits -divers/ enlevements/ les -
rates -de -la -justice -dans -l -affaire -chloe_ 173177. html> (last visited 7
November 2015).
worthy that, for the recently added safety measure, the
2014 Act has again opted for the application of ordinary
sentencing rules, rather than granting competence to the
JAP. This is a sign of defiance towards the JAP, which
has been perceptible in recent years,71 notably because
the prison services have become extremely powerful and
have been put in charge of drafting sentence implemen-
tation Bills. The JAP’s role – or the prosecutor’s – is to
refer a violation of a treatment order to a felony court,
which can impose a sentence for two years’ imprison-
ment, along with a fine of 30,000 euros.
2.10 Evidence-Based Practices
When most of the reforms presented in this article were
enacted, there was no debate pertaining to their compat-
ibility with the current state of scientific knowledge.
France continues to lag behind in evidence-based prac-
tices (EBP), and it was only recently made aware of EBP
during a ‘Consensus Conference’ held in February
2013.72 For the most part, the treatment of sex offenders
comprises anti-androgens (when the person is cared for
by a psychiatrist, which is not always the case) and/or
psychoanalysis or psychodynamics therapy, although
the latter is of little use,73 and the former must be com-
plemented by cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT),
as the Medical Academy has recently acknowledged.74
Since 2008, French prison and probation services have
tried to put in place spurious Risk-Needs-Responsivity
programmes called PPR (programmes de prevention de la
récidive: reoffending prevention programmes) – the
acronym subliminally evoking RNR. Such programmes,
however, have little to do with EBP, and an implemen-
tation study75 revealed that they actually comprise
‘loose’ psychodynamic-like group work, and has little to
do with CBT.76 The programmes have been extended
nationwide in spite of the lack of outcome evaluations
and serious concerns over their potential negative
71. A. Gentilini, ‘Le juge de l’application des peines: vers une disparition?’,
in F. Ghelfi (ed.), Le droit de l’exécution des peines. Espoirs ou désillu-
sion (2014) 107; M. Herzog-Evans, ‘La déjuridictionnalisation de l’appli-
cation des peines’, in S. Boussard (ed.), Les droits de la personne déte-
nue (2013) 259.
72. See the conference website, available at: <http:// conference -consensus.
justice. gouv. fr/> (last visited 8 November 2015). Also see pertaining to
France’s backwardness in terms of risk assessment: M. Herzog-Evans,
‘Outils d’évaluation: sortir des fantasmes et de l’aveuglément idéologi-
que’, AJ Pénal 75 (2012); and in terms of treatment: M. Herzog-Evans,
Moderniser la probation française. Un défi à relever (2013).
73. See inter alia W.L. Marshall, Y.M. Fernandez, L.E. Marchall & G. A. Ser-
ran (eds.), Sexual Offender Treatment. Controversial Issues (2006);
D.R. Laws and W.T. O’Donohue (eds.), Sexual Deviance. Theory,
Assessment, and Treatment (2008).
74. Académie de Médecine, ‘La prévention médicale de la récidive chez les
délinquants sexuels’, 194 Bulletin de l’Académie nationale de méde-
cine 1033 (2010).
75. V. Moulin, Les groupes de parole de prévention de la récidive des per-
sonnes placées sous main de justice, Mission Droit et Justice, April
(2012).
76. O. Vanderstukken and M. Benbouriche, ‘Interventions cognitivo-com-
portementales et prise en charge des auteurs d’agression sexuelle en
France: entre Santé et Justice’, in J.-L. Senon, G. Lopez & R. Cario
(eds.), Psycho-criminologie: clinique, prise en charge, expertise (2012)
123.
78
ELR December 2016 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000060
impact.77 In most cases, however, community treatment
of sex offenders is implemented by local and unspecial-
ised psychiatrists or psychologists, although in recent
years specialised centres called CRIAV (Centres de
Ressources pour les Intervenants auprès des Auteurs de Vio-
lences Sexuelles – Resources Centres for Practitioners in
charge of Sex Offenders) have been created, some of
which are currently trying to become informed about
EBP. It is noteworthy, however, that France has yet to
create an accreditation panel comprising internationally
renowned specialists who are able to discriminate
between EBP and non-EBP programmes. As we have
seen, risk assessment is, so far, largely based on non-
EBP, whether it is conducted by ‘experts’ or by proba-
77. O. Vanderstukken and M. Benbouriche, ‘Principes de prévention de la
récidive et principe de réalité en France: les programmes de prevention
de la récidive à la lumière du modèle « Risque-Besoins-Réceptivité »’,
AJ Pénal November 522 (2014). For a more optimistic view, see R.
Palaric, ‘Les groupes de parole de prévention de la récidive en France:
observation des effets produits’, 21 Pratiques Psychologiques 259
(2015).
tion officers, although there are now modest signs of
change.78
EBP are contentious for a number of reasons. First, they
are wrongly assimilated to punitive policies, and as was
mentioned previously, most issues pertaining to crime
are highly politicised in France. Secondly, they go
against the deeply ingrained psychoanalysis background
of most health practitioners, who tend to be hostile to
CBT. A third reason is that they require structure and
protocols, which breaks with discretionary traditions.
78. See, for instance, J.-P. Guay and D. Lafortune, ‘L’évaluation du risque
de récidive et l’intervention basée sur les données probantes: les condi-
tions nécessaires à l’implantation de méthodes structurées d’évaluation
et d’intervention efficace’, 21 Pratiques Psychologiques 293 (2015).
Table 3 Legal Nature of Safety Measures and Fair Trial
Measure Custodial Non-custodial Fair trial and appeal Competent court
SSJ – Execution of the cus-
todial sentence deter-
mined in advance by
the sentencing court
in case of a future
violation (3 years for
felonies and 7 years
for crimes)
– Adding PSEM
– Adding more obliga-
tions or increasing the
number of appoint-
ments with the pro-
bation officer or JAP
Yes JAP
SJPD – Remission withdraw-
al, partial or total
(return to prison to
serve the sentence)
– Adding PSEM Yes JAP
PSEM Depends on the measure
to which it is attached:
– Revocation of parole
– Remission withdrawal
(SJPD)
– RS (if with SS)
– Adding more obliga-
tions or increasing the
number of appoint-
ments with the pro-
bation officer or JAP
Yes JAP
SS – Placement in RS for a
maximum of 2 years,
renewable ad infini-
tum
– Adding PSEM
– Adding more obliga-
tions or increasing the
number of appoint-
ments with the pro-
bation officer or JAP
Yes – JRRS if custodial
– JAP if non-custodial
RS None, other than its
probable prolongation
/ Yes JRRS
Mandatory treatment if
partially irresponsible
offender
Two-year custodial sen-
tence
Fine of 30,000 euros Yes Sentencing court
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3 The Place of Safety
Measures within the Legal
System
3.1 Character of the Framework
‘Safety measures’ by definition correspond to a legal
label that attempts to justify that such measures do not
have to abide by general criminal law rules. There is
therefore no doubt that SJPD, PSEM, SS and RS are
indeed ‘safety measures’. Conversely, if SSJ appears at
first glance as being a ‘sentence’, thereby abiding by
general criminal law principles, in reality its regime is
mixed. It is a sentence in the sense that it is indeed used
to punish a person who has committed an offence and is
pronounced by sentencing courts. However, it leads to a
(post release) mandatory supervision and treatment
regime that is similar to that of safety measures, and can
be prolonged via SS, a safety measure.
The concept of safety measure is indeed rather blurry. It
is originally derived from the School of Social Defence
as modernised by Marc Ancel,79 and had all but disap-
peared by the time the New Penal Code of 1994 was
enacted. At that time, it was all but forgotten in the
renewed legal framework. However, safety measures
were resuscitated during Nicolas Sarkozy’s era and are
now firmly part of the criminal law landscape, notably
via the dangerousness criterion.80 Previously, the con-
cept of a safety measure appeared to be outdated,
because it did not fit within a society that, at the time,
did not yet use crime as a political tool, and because the
legal doctrine had struggled to distinguish between sen-
tences and ‘safety measures’, regardless of how hard it
had tried to do so.81 Indeed, a safety measure is suppos-
edly not a sentence, but does apply exclusively to
offenders, with this minimal difference: rather than
aiming at punishment or rehabilitation, it aims at pro-
tecting public safety. However, in most cases, it is cer-
tainly perceived by the offender as being punitive
because of its controlling and constraining nature, and
in their current state and focus on treatment, most safe-
ty measures also endeavour to rehabilitate. Moreover,
most sentences likewise aim at protecting the communi-
ty. In other words, the distinction between safety meas-
ures and sentences is so blurry that it cannot predictably
be used in a democratic society governed by the princi-
ple of legality.
Nonetheless, French Courts have used the distinction to
justify violations of general criminal law principles, in
particular, Article 7 of the European Human Rights
Convention and its nearly identical formulation in Arti-
cle 8 of the French Declaration of Human Rights
79. M. Ancel, La défense sociale nouvelle (1966).
80. J. Danet, ‘La dangerosité, une notion criminologique séculaire et muta-
nte’, Champ Pénal (2008), available at: <http:// champpenal. revues. org/
6013> (last visited 8 November 2015).
81. M. Patin ‘La place des mesures de sûreté dans le droit positif moderne’,
RSC 415 (1948); V.R. Schmelck, ‘La distinction entre la peine et la
mesure de sûreté’, in Collective, Mélanges Patin (1965) 181.
(Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen – DDH
– 1789). For instance, such has been the case for
France’s mandatory commitment of mentally ill offend-
ers, a measure that is regulated by Article 706-136 of the
PPC, an article situated right before the newly created
mandatory treatment established by the 2014 Act (Art.
706-136-1 PPC).82 It does not help because the Europe-
an Human Rights Court has recently ruled similarly
that the mandatory commitment of mentally ill persons
was not a sentence and, therefore, that Article 7 did not
apply.83 The reasoning behind this ruling is that this
measure applies to former offenders who have been
deemed partially irresponsible by reason of insanity, in
the same vein as the newly created 2014 Act. For the
ECHR, what counts is that the decisions pronouncing
such safety measures are not in themselves ‘sentencing’
decisions, but are merely stating that the person has a
condition that is disposed to lead to legal consequences.
In its aforementioned 2008 decision, the CC ruled that
Article 8 of the DDH was not violated because safety
measures are ‘not pronounced because of the person’s
guilt’ but because of ‘his particular dangerousness’.84
In essence, however, safety measures are also put in
place because French sentences for sex offenders are
quite lenient, with an average of eight years for rapists,85
and therefore, correspond to a deinstitutionalisation
movement. As Razac aptly puts it, they may be per-
ceived as being ‘the ambulatory treatment of a behav-
ioural anomaly, which is a source of danger for the com-
munity’.86
3.2 Alternatives for Prevention
In France, sex offenders can only be the target of crimi-
nal or health law measures. Civil law does not deal with
legal issues other than contract, family or torts. With
regard to criminal law, in most cases, sex offenders are
sentenced to regular custodial or community sentences.
They are thus submitted to regular probation and treat-
ment obligations. They can benefit from early release
measures such as parole and many others,87 and manda-
tory treatment is a typical obligation attached to such
measures. This is probably a good thing, as release
measures are granted based on release plans submitted
by offenders, whereas safety measures are entirely
82. Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 16 December 2009, no.
09-85.153; 14 April 2010, no. 09-82.291; 12 October 2011, no.
10-88.126.1
83. See ECHR, Berland v. France, Applic. No. 42875/10, 3 September
2015.
84. CC, 21 February 2008, no. 2008-562 DC, spe. § 9; A. Botton, ‘A la
recherche de la peine perdue en droit constitutionnel’, 9 Droit Pénal 7
(2015).
85. The average sentence for rape has consistently oscillated between 8.3
and 8.4 years since 2001 (with the exception of 8.9 in 2010), if life sen-
tences, which, in practice, are only imposed for rape committed in
extreme circumstances, are excluded: P.V. Tournier, Observatoire des
prisons et autres lieux d’enfermement. Tableau de bord du 1er mai
2013 (2013).
86. O. Razac, ‘Les ambiguïtés de l’évolution de l’application des peines à
l’aune des « nouvelles mesures de sûreté »’, AJ Pénal 397 (2008). My
translation.
87. The French legal system is characterised by a great diversity of early
release measures: Herzog-Evans (2016), above n. 14.
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imposed on offenders, and therefore, raise serious wor-
ries in terms of compliance.88
Health or mental health law also organises the mandato-
ry commitment of mentally ill persons, whether they are
sex offenders or not. Such internment is, since the 2011
Act89 on mental health, decided by a judicial criminal
judge, the Judge of Liberties and Detention (juge des
libertés et de la detention). The 2011 Act followed a deci-
sion by the CC which stated that the previous law, pur-
suant to which an administrative authority, the Prefect,
had decisional power, violated the Constitution.90 Dan-
gerous people can also be interned in the aforemen-
tioned UMD. These structures, which were recently
declared constitutional,91 focus both on treatment and
public safety, although they house the most dangerous
of all offenders, often with little hope of significant
improvement. A recent study showed that most of those
affected are sex offenders.92 During Nicolas Sarkozy’s
presence in the government, six new UMDs were
opened, whereas previously there had been only four, all
created between 1910 and 1963. Interestingly, whereas
human rights activists did campaign quite vociferously
against RS, they have been mostly silent concerning
UMDs, despite the fact that they host about 550
patients (vs. 5 in RS and for very short periods of time),
and the difference between the two is rather blurry;
both measures are quite similar in many respects to
Dutch TBS.93
To sum up, there is a graduation of intervention: less
dangerous offenders tend to be dealt with by general
criminal or (mental) health rules, whereas the most dan-
gerous or repeat offenders are dealt with by criminal or
health (internment in UMD) safety measures.
4 Evaluation from a Human
Rights Perspective
4.1 Human Rights Restrictions Intentionally
Imposed by Legislators
Under French law, only legislators are allowed to create
or add human rights constraints. Courts can only imple-
ment the law and the constitution. Leaving aside the
88. M. Herzog-Evans (ed.), Offender Release and Supervision: The Role of
Courts and the Use of Discretion (2015). On the importance of motiva-
tion for sex offenders, see P.M. Yates, D. Prescott & T. Ward, Applying
the Good Lives and Self-Regulation Models to Sex Offender Treat-
ment: A Practical Guide for Clinicians (2010).
89. E. Péchillon, ‘Les quatre temps du soin sous contrainte: Une loi dont
l’application concrète inquiète les professionnels’, 32 La lettre des pro-
fessionnels de santé 8 (2011).
90. CC, 26 November 2010, Applic. No. 2010-71 (QPC).
91. CC, 14 February 2014, Applic. No. 3012-367 (QPC).
92. A. Baratta, J.-L. Senniger & S. Aroudj, ‘Les auteurs de violence sexuelle
en unité pour malade difficile’, 171 Annales Médico-Psychologiques
513 (2013).
93. M.J.F. van der Wolf and M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Mandatory Measures:
“Safety Measures”. Supervision and Detention of Dangerous Offenders
in France and the Netherlands: A Comparative and Human Rights’ Per-
spective’, in M. Herzog-Evans (ed.), Offender Release and Supervision:
The Role of Courts and the Use of Discretion (2015) 193.
highly contentious concept of the ‘safety measure’ and
its main criterion, dangerousness, the constraints that
are actually imposed on offenders by most safety meas-
ures and SSJ are, as we have seen, quite similar to regu-
lar probation, and the courts do not make an excessive
use of the obligations that they could impose. A difficul-
ty arises, however, in terms of consent: whereas release
and most community sentences are pronounced with the
consent of the offender, safety measures are imposed
whether they like it or not. Consent is nonetheless not a
constitutional or a cardinal principle of criminal law,
and its importance can only be stressed on the basis of
theoretical94 or empirical95 arguments.
The detention of dangerous offenders, whether with RS
or UMD, raises serious issues in terms of the right to
freedom of movement and the right to family contact. It
also raises serious issues with regard to the principles of
necessity and proportionality. However, it is mostly in
view of the principles of the non-retrospectivity of
harsher penal laws and of legality that they have been
contested.
That being said, as we have seen, the Council of State
has ruled that part of the internal regulations of Fresnes
were illegal, because they were too similar to prison reg-
ulations, particularly in terms of visitation and corre-
spondence, and because they imposed undue limitations
on the person’s right to a family life. However, these
constraints were nowhere near those in place in the
Guzzardi case,96 a case that has never been mentioned in
French jurisprudence97 or doctrine, which makes the
French ruling rather progressive.
4.2 European Human Rights and French Safety
Measures
Article 5 has not been utilised in French jurisprudence
with the view of safeguarding offenders from RS,
although the condemnation of Germany98 has raised
debates in the French legal doctrine. Most French
authors have considered French regulations to be com-
patible with Article 5, mainly because its procedure
offers sufficient guaranties, and because the detention in
Fresnes focuses mainly on treatment, rather than con-
finement.99 This statement is highly debatable in view
of the decrees that govern it.100 Authors have also
opined that French RS does not violate Article 5
because it was not sufficiently similar to German Safety
94. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Consent and Probation: An Analogy with Contracts’,
7 European Journal of Probation 143 (2015).
95. Herzog-Evans (2015), above n. 88.
96. See ECHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, Applic. No. 7367/76, 3 November 1980.
97. It is important to understand that French courts are not governed by
the rule of precedent and are strictly forbidden from expressly referring
to cases, whether national or European. This does not mean that a giv-
en case cannot influence a French court; however, the court would not
be allowed to expressly mention it.
98. See ECHR, M. v. Germany, Applic. No. 19359/04, 17 December 2009.
99. J.-P. Céré ‘La rétention de sûreté à l’épreuve de la Convention europé-
enne des droits de l’homme’, AJ Pénal 220 (2008); D. Roets, ‘La réten-
tion de sûreté à l’aune du droit européen des droits de l’homme’,
Recueil Dallloz 1840 (2008).
100. M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Les textes d’application de la loi Rétention de sûr-
eté’, Recueil Dalloz 3098 (2008).
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Detention.101 This statement is equally debatable in
view of the direct German – and Dutch102 – inspiration
for French Safety Detention.103
As was mentioned previously, legal disputes have arisen
especially with respect to the issue of retrospective laws.
However, rather than referring to Article 7 or the rather
undemanding Kafkaris ruling,104 the courts have refer-
red mostly to Article 8 of the DDH, which is unsurpris-
ing, given that most of these disputes have been of a
constitutional nature. In all of these cases, a general
acceptance of the retrospective nature of harsher penal
reforms has prevailed. There is only a very limited
exception concerning RS: the Constitutional Council
has ruled that it cannot be retrospective when it is pro-
nounced by a criminal sentencing court, but it has not
disputed it could be when it is pronounced as a sanction
for the violation of SS;105 this has allowed the intern-
ment of five offenders, albeit for very short periods of
time (all under two months) in retrospective conditions
(they had all committed their offences before 2008).
5 Conclusion
There are no less than five safety measures in French
criminal law, and a specific sentence (SSJ) that deals
with sex offences. Of these five, four comprise mandato-
ry supervision upon release; one consists in additional
incarceration. Courts also have several other mental
health options (internment in a psychiatric hospital and
internment in an UMD) that are available to them. The
legal regulations are extremely intricate and complex,
which makes it difficult to draw a broad picture of the
French legal landscape. At the same time, their sheer
complexity, and particularly, their extremely slow pace
and cumbersome procedures have contributed to the
overall very modest use of safety measures, notably the
most constraining ones. The courts have been extremely
prudent in their use of safety measures, and this has a
lot to do with the judiciary’s professional culture, which
comprises both a strong belief in criminal law principles
and a belief in rehabilitation,106 along with a considera-
ble lack of material and human resources. For this rea-
son, in practice, most sex offenders are still processed
through general criminal law procedures and rules,
whether they are custodial and community sentences or
various early release measures with supervision.
101. J. Leblois-Happe, ‘Rétention de sûreté vs Unterbringung in die Sicher-
ungsverwahrung: les enseignements d’une comparaison franco-alle-
mande’, AJ Pénal 209 (2008); C.A. Kupferberd, ‘Sicherungsverwahrung
ou la rétention de sûreté allemande’, Dr. pénal 8 (2008).
102. As a report by two senators reveals: Ph. Goujon and Ch. Gautier, Les
délinquants dangereux atteints de troubles psychiatriques, 420 Rapp.
Sénat (2006).
103. J. Leblois-Happe, above n. 101; C. A. Kupferberd, above n. 101.
104. See ECHR, Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Applic. No. 21906/04, 12 December
2008.
105. CC, 21 févr. 2008, no. 2008-562 DC.
106. M. Herzog-Evans (2014), above n. 42.
Moreover, in terms of the constraints imposed on
offenders, except for RS and PSEM, the supervision
imposed in the context of safety measures and SSJ is
virtually identical to regular probation. The difference
between mandatory safety supervision and regular pro-
bation is also becoming more blurry, as parole can now
be linked to PSEM and prolonged by SS, and can be
perpetual in the case of lifers. However, safety measures
have had a detrimental impact on early release measures
such as parole. Courts can now safely deny sex offend-
ers’ parole, a measure for which they would be blamed if
a new offence was committed, but then impose manda-
tory supervision, when the offender has served his/her
entire sentence. If parole and safety measures’ supervi-
sion is virtually identical, a significant difference is that
parole is applied for by the prisoner, who has to work on
his/her own release plan. Safety measures’ on the other
hand, are imposed upon him. It is therefore doubtful
that the same level of ‘substantive compliance’107 and
adherence to the measure is achieved in both cases.
That being said, the absence of financial and human
resources prevents both legislators and the courts from
imposing very constraining measures, and the lack of a
collaborative culture and EBP awareness means that
such policies have little chance of making a difference.
In spite of the punitive discourse that gained momen-
tum during the Sarkozy era, in reality, sex offenders still
enjoy most of their rights, including the right to become
inebriated and to fully access the Internet. For the most
part, ‘safety’ is brandished as a mere gimmick for politi-
cal purposes, but is not realised in practice. Inevitably,
then, high-profile cases regularly awaken France from
its daze, just long enough for it to pass new laws, before
it falls back into the arms of Morpheus.
107. G. Robinson and F. McNeill, ‘Exploring the Dynamics of Compliance
with Community Penalties’, 12 Theoretical Criminology 431 (2008).
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